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020			_a9781501773822 _9978-1-5017-7382-2
040			_cRU-10907106
041			_aeng
100	1		_aKlimentov, Vassily _4aut _eAuthor _967609
245	1	0	_aA Slow Reckoning _bThe USSR, the Afghan Communists, and Islam _cVassily Klimentov
264			_aIthaca _bCornell University Press _c2024
300			_a317 Seiten
336			_aText _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aComputermedien _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aOnline-Ressource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aNIU Series in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
500			_aE-Book / Zugriff nur im Lesesaal
520			_aA Slow Reckoning examines the Soviet Union's and the Afghan communists' views of and policies toward Islam and Islamism during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). As Vassily Klimentov demonstrates, the Soviet and communist Afghan disregard for Islam was telling of the overall communist approach to reforming Afghanistan and helps explain the failure of their modernization project. A Slow Reckoning reveals how during most of the conflict Babrak Karmal, the ruler installed by the Soviets, instrumentalized Islam in support of his rule while retaining a Marxist-Leninist platform. Similarly, the Soviets at all levels failed to give Islam its due importance as communist ideology and military considerations dominated their decision making. This approach to Islam only changed after Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Karmal by Mohammad Najibullah and prepared to withdraw Soviet forces. Discarding Marxism-Leninism for Islam proved the correct approach, but it came too late to salvage the Soviet nation-building project. A Slow Reckoning also shows how Soviet leaders only started seriously paying attention to an Islamist threat from Afghanistan to Central Asia after 1986. While the Soviets had concerns related to Islamism in 1979, only the KGB believed the threat to be potent. The Soviet elites never fully conceptualized Islamism, continuing to see it as an ideology the United States, Iran, or Pakistan could instrumentalize at will. They believed the Islamists had little agency and that their retrograde ideology could not find massive appeal among progressive Soviet Muslims. In this, they were only partly right.
650			_aAfghanistan-Konflikt <1979-1989>
650			_aFundamentalismus _93853
650			_aKommunismus
650			_aPolitischer Islam _920278
650			_aIslam
651			_aSowjetunion
651			_aAfghanistan _96096
856			_zVolltext _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781501773822
942			_cEB _2z
999			_c73185 _d73185