000 03151nam a22004093i 4500
001 EBC694009
003 MiAaPQ
005 20250530144002.0
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 250530s2007 xx o ||||0 eng d
020 _a9780191519307
_q(electronic bk.)
020 _z9780198237907
040 _aMiAaPQ
_beng
_cMiAaPQ
100 1 _aFricker, Miranda.
_966377
245 1 0 _aEpistemic Injustice :
_bPower and the Ethics of Knowing.
250 _a1st ed.
264 1 _aOxford :
_bOxford University Press, Incorporated,
_c2007.
264 4 _c©2007.
300 _a1 online resource (199 pages)
336 _aText
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aComputermedien
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aOnline Resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aE-Book-ProQuest / Fernzugriff nach Registrierung möglich
505 0 _aIntro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Testimonial Injustice -- 1.1 Power -- 1.2 Identity Power -- 1.3 The Central Case of Testimonial Injustice -- 2. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy -- 2.1 Stereotypes and Prejudicial Stereotypes -- 2.2 Testimonial Injustice without Prejudice? -- 2.3 The Wrong of Testimonial Injustice -- 3. Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony -- 3.1 Sketching the Dialectical Position -- 3.2 The Responsible Hearer? -- 3.3 Virtuous Perception: Moral and Epistemic -- 3.4 Training Sensibility -- 4. The Virtue of Testimonial Justice -- 4.1 Correcting for Prejudice -- 4.2 History, Blame, and Moral Disappointment -- 5. The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice -- 5.1 A Third Fundamental Virtue of Truth -- 5.2 A Hybrid Virtue: Intellectual-Ethical -- 6. Original Significances: The Wrong Revisited -- 6.1 Two Kinds of Silence -- 6.2 The Very Idea of a Knower -- 7. Hermeneutical Injustice -- 7.1 The Central Case of Hermeneutical Injustice -- 7.2 Hermeneutical Marginalization -- 7.3 The Wrong of Hermeneutical Injustice -- 7.4 The Virtue of Hermeneutical Justice -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
520 _aEpistemic Injustice explores a form of injustice which has so far been largely ignored in English-language philosophy: epistemic injustice - that is to say, a wrong suffered in one's capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In connection with both, she argues that our testimonial sensibility needs to incorporate a corrective, anti-prejudicial virtue that can be used to promote a more veridical and a more democratic epistemic practice.
653 _aFairness.
653 _aJustice (Philosophy).
653 _aEthics.
653 _aKnowledge, Theory of.
655 _aFernzugriff
_9230
655 4 _aElectronic books.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_aFricker, Miranda
_tEpistemic Injustice
_dOxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated,c2007
_z9780198237907
856 4 0 _uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/maxweberstiftung-ebooks/detail.action?docID=694009
_zVolltext
942 _cEB
999 _c72499
_d72499