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Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Testimonial Injustice -- 1.1 Power -- 1.2 Identity Power -- 1.3 The Central Case of Testimonial Injustice -- 2. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy -- 2.1 Stereotypes and Prejudicial Stereotypes -- 2.2 Testimonial Injustice without Prejudice? -- 2.3 The Wrong of Testimonial Injustice -- 3. Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony -- 3.1 Sketching the Dialectical Position -- 3.2 The Responsible Hearer? -- 3.3 Virtuous Perception: Moral and Epistemic -- 3.4 Training Sensibility -- 4. The Virtue of Testimonial Justice -- 4.1 Correcting for Prejudice -- 4.2 History, Blame, and Moral Disappointment -- 5. The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice -- 5.1 A Third Fundamental Virtue of Truth -- 5.2 A Hybrid Virtue: Intellectual-Ethical -- 6. Original Significances: The Wrong Revisited -- 6.1 Two Kinds of Silence -- 6.2 The Very Idea of a Knower -- 7. Hermeneutical Injustice -- 7.1 The Central Case of Hermeneutical Injustice -- 7.2 Hermeneutical Marginalization -- 7.3 The Wrong of Hermeneutical Injustice -- 7.4 The Virtue of Hermeneutical Justice -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Epistemic Injustice explores a form of injustice which has so far been largely ignored in English-language philosophy: epistemic injustice - that is to say, a wrong suffered in one's capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In connection with both, she argues that our testimonial sensibility needs to incorporate a corrective, anti-prejudicial virtue that can be used to promote a more veridical and a more democratic epistemic practice.