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Cover -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Intellectual virtue: some examples -- 1.2 Virtue epistemology -- 1.2.1 A very brief history -- 1.2.2 Four varieties of character-based virtue epistemology -- 1.3 An overview of the book -- 2 Intellectual Virtues -- 2.1 Some natural groupings of intellectual virtues -- 2.2 Virtues, faculties, talents, temperaments, and skills -- 2.2.1 Faculties -- 2.2.2 Talents -- 2.2.3 Temperaments -- 2.2.4 Skills -- 2.3 Conclusion -- 3 Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue -- 3.1 Zagzebski's account of knowledge -- 3.2 Are intellectual virtues (plus true belief) sufficient for knowledge? -- 3.3 Are intellectual virtues necessary for knowledge? -- 3.3.1 Low-grade "knowledge" is not genuine knowledge -- 3.3.2 Mimicking an intellectually virtuous agent -- 3.3.3 "Low-level" virtuous motives and actions -- 3.3.4 Conclusion -- 3.4 Prospects for Strong Conservative VE -- 4 Virtue and Character in Reliabilism -- 4.1 The exclusion of character virtues within reliabilist epistemology -- 4.2 Character virtues as reliabilist knowledge-makers -- 4.3 Theoretical reverberations -- 4.4 Conclusion -- 5 Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue -- 5.1 Problem cases -- 5.1.1 Cases of defective inquiry -- 5.1.2 Cases of defective "doxastic handling" of evidence -- 5.2 Modifying evidentialism -- 5.3 BonJour's evidentialism -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 A Personal Worth Conception of Intellectual Virtue -- 6.1 Preliminaries -- 6.2 Personal worth and intellectual virtue -- 6.2.1 Personal intellectual worth -- 6.2.2 Clarifications -- 6.2.3 The basis of personal worth simpliciter -- 6.2.4 The basis of personal intellectual worth -- 6.2.5 The account summarized -- 6.2.6 The broad structure of an intellectual virtue -- 6.3 Assessing the account -- 6.3.1 Intellectual carefulness and thoroughness -- 6.3.2 Creativity and originality.

6.3.3 Intellectual conscientiousness -- 6.3.4 Intellectual generosity -- 6.3.5 Conclusion -- 7 The Personal Worth Conception and Its Rivals -- 7.1 Similar conceptions -- 7.1.1 Hurka's "recursive" conception -- 7.1.2 Adams and "excellence in being for the good" -- 7.2 Dissimilar conceptions -- 7.2.1 Driver's consequentialist account -- 7.2.2 Hursthouse's naturalism -- 7.2.3 Zagzebski's "motivational" account -- 7.3 Conclusion -- 8 Open-Mindedness -- 8.1 Some initial characterizations of open-mindedness -- 8.2 Open-mindedness: a unified account -- 8.2.1 The conceptual core of open-mindedness -- 8.2.2 A definition of open-mindedness -- 8.3 Open-mindedness and other cognitive excellences -- 8.4 When to be open-minded? -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 9 Intellectual Courage -- 9.1 Intellectual courage vs. moral courage -- 9.2 Some examples -- 9.3 The "context" of intellectual courage -- 9.4 The "substance" of intellectual courage -- 9.5 Intellectual courage: a definition -- 9.6 Challenging cases -- 9.6.1 Ill-motivated courage? -- 9.6.2 Easy courage? -- 9.7 When to be intellectually courageous? -- 10 The Status and Future of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology -- 10.1 Four varieties of character-based virtue epistemology -- 10.2 Assessing the alternatives -- 10.2.1 Strong Conservative VE -- 10.2.2 Weak Conservative VE -- 10.2.3 Strong Autonomous VE -- 10.2.4 Weak Autonomous VE -- 10.2.5 A final objection -- Appendix: On the Distinction between Intellectual and Moral Virtues -- A.1 Belief vs. action -- A.2 A unifying principle for intellectual virtues -- A.3 A teleological account -- A.4 An alternative proposal -- A.5 Implications -- A.6 Driver on intellectual and moral virtue -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

Jason Baehr presents a new theory of 'responsibilist' or character-based virtue-epistemology -- an approach in which intellectual character traits are given a central and fundamental role. He examines the nature and structure of an intellectual virtue and accounts for the role of reflection on intellectual virtues in epistemology.